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RESPONSE 
 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AS PUBLIC LAW 
JAMES D. COX†
In response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
 
 
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market1
For some time now, shareholder suits have been a whipping boy 
for what ails American capitalism.  Bratton and Wachter earn high 
marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than oth-
ers in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are 
among the most thoughtful to be found in this area.  Nonetheless, 
their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition 
to the lacunae in their analysis, they commit an even more fundamen-
tal error by taking the narrow view that securities class actions have 
only a private and not a public mission.
 provides a wide-ranging 
criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions.  In 
broad overview, Professors William Bratton and Michael Wachter 
would restrict securities class actions to nondiversified information 
traders and ramp up SEC enforcement efforts.  However, both their 
critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms 
they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both 
the criticism and reform of securities class actions. 
2
 
†
Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  I am grateful 
for the comments on an earlier draft by Professors Samuel Buell, Frank Partnoy, and 
Randall Thomas.  Errors in failing to follow their wise counsel are mine. 
  To be sure, committing to 
both a larger enforcement budget for the SEC and a mission to re-
1
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69. 
2
Id. at 133. 
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dress private losses caused by fraudulent financial reporting would 
make fraud enforcement more public than before.  But this conjecture 
assumes such enforcement would be as robust and frequent as presently 
occurs with private suits.  As will be seen, the checkered history of SEC 
enforcement of market frauds belies such a hopeful outcome. 
Bratton and Wachter do not start their critique with a solid foun-
dation of developing the purpose that we might wish to serve with pri-
vate, or for that matter government, suits prosecuting fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting.  We might simply conclude that everyone is against 
fraud so that prosecution, either private or public, is desirable.  But, 
had they made this inquiry, Bratton and Wachter might well have 
shortened their lengthy Article by omitting the titillating suggestion 
that public companies and their stockholders would benefit from a 
shareholder plebiscite on whether shareholders of that company can 
seek private relief for any damage they might have suffered.3
The securities laws carry out several public objectives in addition 
to protecting the individual investor.
  Implicit 
in the suggestion of such a shareholder plebiscite is the view that the 
securities laws, and particularly their enforcement, are private and not 
public law.  Thus, one must look beyond this Article for a study that 
begins with first principles and then progresses from there to a more 
refined and nuanced investigation of how we might advance those 
principles.  Might we not just as easily defer to the shareholders on 
other matters, such as whether they are a reporting company, whether 
they will have an audit committee, and whether their annual reports 
should be accompanied by management’s certification of the adequa-
cy of internal controls and the auditor’s attestation to management’s 
assessment?  Some may not appreciate these requirements (perhaps 
they are the same individuals who dislike seat belts or other mandated 
safety features that increase the costs of their cars), but they are laws 
that are public in the sense that they advance the view that perceived 
social benefits are larger than the individual’s benefit derived from 
making her own choice. 
4
 
3
Id. at 129. 
  Thus, the quality of U.S. securi-
ties laws is directly linked to the cost of capital.  To be sure, investors 
4
The commonly recognized objectives are:  informing investors, enhancing allo-
cational efficiency, reducing the frequency of fraudulent offerings of securities, heigh-
tening managerial responsiveness to owners, and reducing opportunistic behavior.  See 
James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace:  Survival Strategies for a 75-Year Old SEC, 95 
VA. L. REV. 941, 961-72 (2009) (reviewing the likely impact on each of these objectives 
if differing disclosure standards apply in the same efficient market). 
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could self-insure by imposing a higher discount rate in pricing the 
shares of a firm opting out of the potential for fraud-on-the-market 
suits as a means to correct, and even deter, fraudulent financial re-
porting.  But this applies at the average level so that when the fraud 
occurs, the shareholder—particularly one not well diversified—takes 
the hit for the above-average loss.  Moreover, the higher discount rate 
would be systematic across all opting-out firms.5  This poses issues for 
the United States generally, since one means of promoting U.S. capi-
tal markets has been the strength of our securities laws.  To be sure, 
U.S. capital markets do not enjoy the dominance they had twenty-five 
years ago, but they still are attractive for domestic and foreign issuers 
at a level that makes U.S. markets competitive.6
Bratton and Wachter direct most of their complaints against se-
curities class actions because they view this genre of suit as serving on-
ly a compensatory function.
  But the overall point 
here is that Bratton and Wachter assume, without analysis, that the se-
curities laws are part of the private law and have no connection with 
more broadly based public welfare considerations. 
7  For some time I have asserted that 
shareholder suits should not be so viewed.  The point I first made 
nearly thirty years ago has not changed, and it comes into bold relief 
against the analysis of Bratton and Wachter:  by characterizing the so-
cial calculus for evaluating the worth of all shareholder suits—whether 
derivative or securities fraud litigation—as compensatory, commenta-
tors and the courts have guaranteed that such suits will not measure 
up to their expected purpose.8
 
5
See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:  A Critical Response to the “Chi-
cago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 639-40 (reviewing why private ordering in the con-
text of insider trading results in higher systemic risk, and hence greater costs of capi-
tal, for all securities). 
  Complaints such as those set forth by 
Bratton and Wachter—that the suits retrieve only a small portion of 
6
For a crisp assessment of the forces causing more foreign issuers to list closer to 
their principal places of business, see Jim O’Neill & Sandra Lawson, Is Wall Street 
Doomed?, in GOLDMAN SACHS, BRICS AND BEYOND 225 (2007), available at http:// 
www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-and-beyond-book-pdfs/brics-
full-book.pdf. 
7
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 84. 
8
See generally James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. 
REV. 3 (1999) (identifying approaches courts should take to add a greater deterrence 
function to private suits, including viewing their objective as deterrence and not com-
pensation); see also James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries 
for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984) (reviewing the impossi-
bility of shareholder suits being understood to be compensatory). 
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the damage caused by the fraudulent reporting—document this fear.9  
The collective loss of investors in a large capitalization firm for fraudu-
lent reporting over three or five financial quarters is generally im-
mense.  Because in most instances the corporation and the responsi-
ble employees did not gain any amount approaching the sums 
investors have lost, a judgment holding the corporation fully account-
able would subject the corporation to debilitating liability.  Instead of 
focusing on the investors’ loss, we can focus on the purposes behind 
proscriptions of financial-reporting fraud, thus shifting our focus to 
the public objectives that can be served by the suit.  Here we are aided 
by the reasoning in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, which recognized that implied 
private rights of action advance a public norm by allowing the suit’s 
plaintiff (i.e., class counsel) to serve as a private attorney general.10
With the compensatory orientation tightly under their belts, Brat-
ton and Wachter take the predictable shot at securities class actions, 
namely that the compensatory benefits of such suits are suspect be-
cause of the twin effects of circularity and the absence of net loss to 
the well-diversified investor.
 
11
 
9
Judging whether suits recover a lot or a little vis-à-vis the class’s damages is par-
ticularly problematic because so many variables can affect stock prices during the pe-
riod between the telling of the lie and the revealing of the truth.  Indeed, plaintiffs and 
defendants may begin their contest with wide-ranging estimates of the losses, but reali-
ty generally sets in for both as their settlement negotiations test their respective eco-
nometric models’ assumptions.  Thus, any assertion that the resulting settlement is 
larger or smaller in contrast to the investor losses is inherently whimsical.  
  Circularity arises when the ultimate sum 
recovered flows from the corporate entity itself, such that, in the case 
of fraud-induced investors acquiring the entity’s shares, the injured 
investors are indirectly paying their own recovery.  And, over time, the 
well-diversified investors suffer no net loss because they will be winners 
as frequently as they are losers, where “winning” and “losing” reflect 
that the fraud’s impact on the share price bestows something of a 
windfall to one side of the trade and a loss to the other side of the 
trade.  While not developed in their Article, presumably Bratton and 
Wachter would allow recovery against the corporation if the corpora-
tion was itself trading with the investors, e.g., if it lied in the prospec-
tus accompanying its public offering of securities or in the merger ma-
terials produced in the acquisition of another firm.  So viewed, the 
authors remove well-diversified investors from the class of investors 
10
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a 
necessary supplement to Commission action.”), abrogated by Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1979) (finding that the private right of action under 
14(a) did not extend to all provisions of the 1934 Act). 
11
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 93-99. 
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entitled to sue for securities fraud.  Instead, they accord standing to 
nondiversified investors deemed “information traders.”12
It is also not clear that we should penalize the noise trader or, for 
that matter, the well-diversified investor.  Each is behaving presumably 
just as Bratton and Wachter would wish, namely according to the fun-
damental tenets of portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothe-
sis.  Noise traders neither read nor analyze.  But they do trust the pric-
ing of the market.  Diversified investors understand that efficient 
markets calibrate risk and return, and invest according to the individ-
ual security’s impact on the overall risk of the investor’s portfolio.  
Thus, each places his trust in the market, but why should such trusting 
investors be deprived of a right of action when their trust was mis-
placed?  And, is it not possible that the diversified investor might have 
invested less, or not at all, in that particular company if it had honestly 
reported its results?  Finally, we might ask why would we wish to re-
move the benefit of class action suits from fully diversified investors.  
Might this just drive them to gerrymander their portfolio so as to qual-
ify for class action treatment by narrowly falling out of the number of 
stocks needed to be deemed diversified? 
  The infor-
mational traders are the opposite of the noise traders who just pile 
onto publicly traded shares without digesting any information, includ-
ing the false information, about the firm.  On these points, we might 
fault Bratton and Wachter for being too generous.  They should have 
eliminated all the investor suits.  Why should it matter if you have one 
trader flipping 100 quarters within one time period or one trader flip-
ping 100 dimes over multiple time periods?  In either case, the results 
would be expected to be the same:  heads about 50% of the time.  That 
is, if investors are repeat players in the market, over time they will have 
the experience of selling at a price inflated by fraud and buying at a 
price inflated by fraud.  The well-diversified investor just gets to the av-
erage outcome more quickly.  Should we base public policy on alacrity? 
In fact, Bratton and Wachter may well have gone the full nine 
yards and eliminated most securities class actions.  To be sure, they 
would preserve a private suit for nondiversified information traders 
who can establish their reliance.13
 
12
Id. at 97-99. 
  But wait, wasn’t the whole point of 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson that if reliance were required to be so estab-
13
Id. at 102. 
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lished, then the suit could not be certified as a class action? 14
With regard to the circularity and portfolio arguments advanced 
against securities fraud suits, why not raise the same problem when 
there is a patent dispute between, for example, Advanced Micro De-
vices and Intel?  Both of these large-cap firms enjoy a substantial insti-
tutional following.  Why do we not just dismiss any private suit be-
tween two companies who are owned in some significant way by 
diversified investors on the ground that there is no gain to their insti-
tutional owners that can flow from the suit?  After all, patent and cop-
yright infringement suits are a way of doing business in the technology 
industries, and CalPERS is just as likely one day to own the shares of 
an infringer as to own the shares of the infringed.  Today, there is in-
deed an epidemic of expensive IP litigation.  It may well be a net loss 
to diversified investors.  We do not cast these suits aside, regardless of 
the investor pool of the suit’s combatants, because even though we 
view patents and copyrights as being private property in light of the 
rewards they confer on their owner, we also believe that these are 
rights that advance our general welfare.  Simply put, we as a nation 
benefit from protecting investment in technology.  Thus, there is a 
distinct public law aspect to our willingness to sustain such suits de-
spite the netting-out effects among their owners. 
  When 
one must show reliance, individual questions, not common questions, 
predominate.  It may well be that in any false reporting case the group 
of relying, nondiversified investors would be sufficiently small so that 
the burdens of probing the alleged reliance by each class member 
would not render class action status inefficient.  Yet uncertainty ab-
ounds regarding how common questions would be resolved in indi-
vidual cases since this could depend on how many such investors 
would qualify as informational nondiversified traders.  Notwithstand-
ing whether their claims can be aggregated, the question is really 
whether the suit promises enough “honey” to attract the class counsel 
bear.  Thus, it may well be that limiting suits to only nondiversified in-
formation traders would ultimately mean that there would be few such 
suits because they could not be aggregated to make the suit efficient 
for the injured investors—or even if aggregated to that effect, the po-
tential recovery may not be sufficient to attract counsel. 
Thus, we see a big hole in the reasoning that underlies the critical 
fulcrum of The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market’s reasoning that, 
 
14
485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (noting that requiring “proof of individualized re-
liance” would effectively prevent class actions, because “individual issues then would 
have overwhelmed the common ones”). 
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in the case of the diversified investor, there is no value to the suit—a 
conclusion reached because the Article never views the securities laws, 
and particularly the proscription of fraudulent financial reporting, as 
embodying public law that advances public welfare.  That is, by en-
hancing compliance with disclosure requirements, the underlying ob-
jectives of our disclosure laws are furthered.15
Bratton and Wachter favor SEC enforcement in place of private 
enforcement.  They support their reasoning by first disputing that 
SEC enforcement resources are too limited
 
16 and strengthen their 
case by asserting that the differential in results achieved per dollar in-
vested is one-third less for private suits than public suits.17
A. Erroneous Accounting 
  The latter is 
a back-of-the-envelope calculation in which Bratton and Wachter di-
vide the funds recovered by the SEC in its enforcement actions during 
the 1999–2009 period by the five-year (2004–2008) average enforce-
ment budget, and then compare that ratio (4.35) with the quotient of 
private settlements during the same period divided by the assumed 
average 23% attorneys’ fees, yielding a higher 6.20 ratio.  There are 
multiple problems with this calculation.  Their suggestions are open 
to two broad criticisms, each addressed below. 
There is a serious likelihood that this back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion omits many costs, such that the SEC enforcement costs are sub-
stantially greater than calculated.  First, the SEC’s enforcement efforts 
span a good many areas; only a small number of its enforcement suits 
in any year belong to the set out of which the type of violations for 
which class action securities suits arise.  Thus, for a meaningful calcu-
lation, the denominator in the calculation for public enforcement 
needs to be slimmed considerably since only about one-half of the en-
forcement actions that the SEC initiates in any year are of the type 
that has the potential to become a private class action.18
 
15
See Cox, supra note 4, at 966-67 (arguing that disclosure rules increase manager 
accountability).   
  Also, the nu-
merator should only include recoveries from enforcement actions of 
the type that lends itself to class action treatment.  With the numera-
16
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 148. 
17
Id. at 162. 
18
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:  
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 750 (2003) (basing this estimate on SEC data 
from 1997–2002). 
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tor and denominator so adjusted, it is likely that the comparative ad-
vantage first calculated disappears. 
Second, it is likely that the expenses the government incurs to 
prosecute securities fraud are significantly greater than those reported 
for the SEC’s enforcement budget standing alone.  In fact, many of 
the frauds prosecuted by the SEC in 2002 and 2003 were the result of 
the efforts of many governmental bodies as well as self-regulatory or-
ganizations.  For example, Enron and other large capitalization com-
panies were the object of a strike force that included multiple gov-
ernment agencies.19  Similarly, the massive $1.4 billion global 
settlement against ten investment banking firms was the product of the 
efforts of the New York Attorney General, the NASD and NYSE, and the 
SEC.20
Third, the only systematic study comparing the targets of SEC en-
forcement actions with the targets of private suits unaccompanied by 
parallel SEC enforcement action undermines the recommendation of 
Bratton and Wachter.  The first such comparative study of this ques-
tion, which I completed with Professors Randall Thomas and Dana 
Kiku, focused on settlements reached in the 1997–2002 period.
  Thus, because it is common for enforcement agencies to work 
together, a calculation of the costs of government enforcement in any 
particular case needs to consider the costs borne by all government 
agencies that are involved in that matter.  The Bratton and Wachter da-
ta does not do this. 
21  The 
data revealed that the SEC systematically targeted smaller firms, for 
which investors suffered smaller provable losses, and that the targeted 
firms were experiencing greater financial distress than were the firms 
that undertook settlements in private suits unaccompanied by parallel 
SEC action.22  A follow-up study focused on an expanded time period, 
1990–2003, and divided the study to examine settlements in the post-
Enron period, 2002 and 2003.23
 
19
See Kristen Hays, Task Force Prosecutors Prosper After Enron Case, HOUS. CHRON., 
Nov. 2, 2006, at C1 (profiling the prosecutors involved in the strike force).   
  In this study, financial distress is sta-
20
See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen., SEC, N.Y. Attorney Gen., 
NASD, NASAA, NYSE, and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform 
Inv. Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/ 
2002/dec/dec20b_02.html (detailing the terms of the settlement). 
21
Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 18, at 749. 
22
Id. at 776-77. 
23
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Public and Private Enforce-
ment of the Securities Laws:  Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
893, 899 (2005). 
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tistically significant in identifying firms subject to SEC enforcement.24  
And for the 2002 and 2003 cases, the SEC appears to have shifted away 
from a bias toward suits against firms experiencing financial distress, 
preferring cases where investors suffered greater provable losses, al-
beit in firms that were smaller than those targeted in private suits 
without a parallel SEC action.25  Moreover, our review of SEC en-
forcement releases and Lexis-Nexis public reports of any SEC in-
quiry—investigation or enforcement action, a more sweeping category 
than a formal enforcement action—finds such evidence in less than 
19% of settled securities class actions.26
Fourth, the above data support the view that the private suits 
without SEC action challenge larger capitalized firms that are not ex-
periencing financial distress.  The risks of these suits is greater; suits 
against such opponents mean that, because the firm is large and not 
experiencing financial distress, the defendant will be a stronger op-
ponent throughout the litigation.  Accordingly, we would expect 
greater rewards to the entrepreneurial lawyer.  Thus, we should ex-
pect suits to entail a greater expense-to-benefit ratio when there is not 
a parallel SEC action than when the SEC is the litigant. 
  We strongly suspect that en-
forcement suits would be a small subpart of that percentage.  In sum, 
these data support the view that the SEC is an important, but only a 
supporting, player in redressing on behalf of investors the damages 
caused by fraudulent financial reporting. 
Fifth, the SEC cause of action faces none of the hurdles that in-
creases the costs of prosecuting a private suit.  The SEC in prosecuting 
its suits does not face a heightened pleading standard27 or the bar to 
discovery28 that the private plaintiff must address before initiating suit.  
Each of these innovations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 199529
 
24
Id. at 905. 
 requires a substantial investment of resources by plain-
tiffs’ counsel that are not required when the SEC initiates suit.  More-
25
Id. at 906. 
26
See id. at 895, 900-01 tbls. 2 & 3 (2005) (reviewing 389 settlements reached from 
1990 to 2003, in which there were reports of SEC involvement in 73 cases).  
27
This requirement calls for the private plaintiff to allege scienter with particu-
lar facts, and those facts must give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the requisite scienter.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
28
Id. at § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery during any 
pending motion to dismiss). 
29
See Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
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over, to survive a motion to dismiss, the SEC is not required to allege 
loss causation to recover.  Private litigants must allege loss causation,30
B.  Institutional Constraints 
 
and in a fraud-on-the-market case this customarily requires expensive 
econometric analysis to accompany the pleadings.  Therefore, even 
accepting that the authors’ back-of-the-envelope calculation was cor-
rectly made, we should not be surprised that private suits are more 
costly than SEC enforcement actions.  They clearly do cost more, as 
the SEC and the private litigant face very different constraints in their 
pursuits of justice.  One might argue that this makes the case that the 
SEC should be the plaintiff so as to circumvent the restrictions 
placed on private suits by the Supreme Court and Congress.  This 
may well be the case, but we can ponder how long it would be the 
case if the SEC were increasingly stepping forward to bring damage 
actions on behalf of investors. 
Bratton and Wachter do not consider the institutional constraints 
that would confront the SEC were it to assume the role of recovering 
investor losses.  The belief that an SEC enforcement action can pro-
vide all the relief that injured investors can expect from a class action 
damages suit ignores the statutory constraints that surround SEC sanc-
tions.  Simply stated, the SEC is not empowered to recover the sums 
investors lost because of the fraud.  There is no statutory authority for 
such recovery, and SEC sanctions and settlements are not framed by 
the losses caused by a violation.  With respect to monetary sanctions, 
the SEC has the express31 and implied32 authority to require dis-
gorgement of any gains the defendant derived from his violation.  The 
SEC also can extract fines, but there is a ceiling on the amount of the 
fine per violation.33
 
30
See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (holding that fraud on 
the market requires not just allegations that the misrepresentation inflated the stock’s 
price, but also evidence of loss causation once the untruthful statement became public).  
  Furthermore, any movement by the SEC toward 
31
See, e.g., § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (permitting civil penalties in se-
curities cases). 
32
See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(awarding disgorgement remedy for violations of the early warning provisions of the 
Williams Act).  
33
See, e.g., § 21(d)(3)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (setting the maximum 
fine per violation at $500,000 for an entity and at $100,000 for an individual).  To be 
sure, SEC settlements frequently involve amounts greatly in excess of the issuer fine 
ceiling of $500,000.  This occurs when the SEC takes the position that the issuer and 
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seeking “damages” suffered by the investor class would likely invite a 
range of legal developments, many beyond its rulemaking authority.  
At a minimum, any effort to recover investors’ losses would need con-
gressional action since, as stated before, the securities laws not only do 
not provide this authority, but also expressly provide that the mone-
tary sanction is a fine or disgorgement.34
The above points at least qualify the optimism that Bratton and 
Wachter express for the SEC’s ability to fill any void created by share-
holders opting for SEC enforcement over private enforcement.  These 
points also raise issues that may be dispositive for reasonable share-
holders deciding whether to give up their private suit and to look to 
the SEC to seek recovery should they someday be defrauded. 
  Moreover, if damages are to 
be recovered, then we would expect the same issues that private liti-
gants face bearing on causation, and particularly loss causation, to 
arise.  The expected incorporation into such an SEC enforcement suit 
of such a burdensome requirement would not likely endear these suits 
to the staff at the SEC.  If we believe—and it is not clear that Bratton 
and Wachter do believe—that the SEC enforcement efforts are un-
derstaffed, then the additional burden of seeking damages on behalf 
of injured investors raises doubts regarding just how eager the thin 
enforcement staff will be to characterize their suits as seeking damages 
as opposed to a fine and disgorgement, or less. 
Bratton and Wachter raise legitimate questions about the deter-
rent effects of securities class actions where the norm is that a settle-
ment is paid solely by the corporation and not by the individuals who 
are responsible for the defalcation.  Unfortunately, the authors ap-
pear to accept the status quo, i.e., entity recovery, and do not address 
how we can move toward holding individuals responsible.  In failing to 
engage this issue, they tacitly reflect the reality of today’s antifraud lit-
igation:  corporations pay and individual wrongdoers get a pass.  This 
truism is now supported by three Supreme Court decisions.35
 
others have committed multiple violations.  Nonetheless, the amount reached in such 
settlements is not anchored to the amount of investor losses suffered. 
  In com-
34
Indeed, the natural implication of the “fair funds” provision of section 
308(9)(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears to bar implicitly any action for damages 
by the SEC.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (“[T]he amount 
of such civil penalty shall . . . become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of 
the victims of such violation.”).  This provision provides that the SEC can, whenever 
there is disgorgement recovered from a respondent in an enforcement action, dedi-
cate the sum so recovered, plus any fine, to a fund to be returned to injured investors.  
35
See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 
(2011) (holding that an investment advisor who prepared a prospectus for a family 
fund was not responsible for misrepresentations appearing in the prospectus); Stone-
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bination, they demand that the investor, at the time of trading, be 
able to attribute the false statement to the individual defendant.  Thus 
we find the following is well engrained in the law:  if the false state-
ment is conceived and drafted by the defendant, but does not bear 
the defendant’s name or otherwise identify the defendant as its maker, 
then the defendant is not a primary participant and, hence, has no re-
sponsibility to the defrauded investor. 
Our own work, published in this journal, points to the perverse 
conundrum that the Supreme Court has created: 
[A]fter settlement [of a securities class action], defendant firms expe-
rience liquidity problems, as well as worsening Altman’s Z-scores.  Here, 
the distinction between causation and correlation is important.  For ex-
ample, do our findings regarding the deterioration of the Altman’s Z-
scores suggest that settlements drive firms toward financial distress (i.e., 
settlements are causally related to the worsening situation), or do they 
suggest that the financial deterioration in earlier time periods continues 
downward regardless of the settlement or its size (i.e., settlements are 
merely correlated with weakening financial performance), or do they 
represent some combination of both? . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Although uncertainty persists about the precise connection between 
settlements and financial distress, there is no uncertainty that firms in-
volved in securities class action litigation experience statistically greater 
 
ridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166-67 (2008) (hold-
ing that a corporation’s executives who knowingly prepared false documents to con-
ceal from their customer’s auditors that $17 million in the customer’s revenues were 
fraudulent roundtrip transactions, and did so to retain the customer as a client, were 
not responsible to investors who purchased the customer’s shares at prices inflated due 
to the fraudulent roundtrip transactions); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding, broadly, that there is no aid-
ing and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act); see also Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. 
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that an outside law-
yer who on seventeen different occasions engineered on behalf of the client, Refco, 
fraudulent sham transactions for the purpose of concealing in various offering docu-
ments that Refco had massive trading losses and was unable to repay millions of dollars 
due on margin was not liable as a primary participant to investors who suffered signifi-
cant losses upon the ultimate bankruptcy of Refco); Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 
698 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the president of a newspaper subsidiary who fraudu-
lently overstated the number of subscribers and revenues for the subsidiary was not 
liable to those who purchased the parent company’s shares at inflated prices even 
though the president’s misstatements were incorporated into the consolidated finan-
cial statements issued by the parent); In re Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., 486 F. 
Supp. 2d 1301, 1311-12 (D. Utah 2008) (finding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim 
because defendant CEO, who had falsely represented company financial data to an 
auditor to obtain a “clean” audit, did not make statements publicly).     
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risks of financial distress than their cohort firms.  Since the burdens of 
ongoing embroilment in securities class action contribute to the firm 
experiencing value-decreasing pressures, our findings lend strong sup-
port for the view that such suits are better directed toward the officers, 
advisors, and other individuals who bear responsibility for the fraudulent 
representation(s) that spawned the suit. . . . 
. . . The Supreme Court’s narrow view of who is subject to primary liabili-
ty under the SEC’s antifraud provision has prompted the lower courts to 
repeatedly reach results at odds with imposing just deserts on viola-
tors. . . . In the wake of such decisions, the focus on entity liability is like-
ly to continue, and just deserts are likely to remain an unfulfilled public 
policy objective . . . .
36
In such a world, deterrence is not likely.  If not, can justice be 
served by recoveries that reach only the corporation’s treasury or in-
surance policy?  This may be the ultimate point behind The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market.  That is, without a legal process that will 
reach the assets of those responsible for the lie, cynicism for the entire 
process sets in and we lose interest in thinking about who, if anyone, 
was harmed and how we might best construct a process for compen-
sating for any such harm.  Thus, Bratton and Wachter are rightly cyni-
cal.  But the answer to such cynicism is to focus on first principles:  
who should be financially responsible for false financial reporting.  
Perhaps, having stuck their toes in the water of securities litigation, 
they might next address this question, and in doing so, consider some 
of the lacunae identified above. 
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